:by :

: Tayac n :

: :

: A tactical manual for the revolutionary that :

: was published by the Central Intelligence :

: Agency and distributed to the Contras in :

: Central America. :

: :

: Combat Arms urges gun owners in the United :

: States to become very familiar with the :

: contents of this manual and to discuss it :

: among your family and friends. Liberty knows :

: no peace. :

PREFACE

Guerrilla warfare is essentially a political war. Therefore, its area

of operations exceeds the territorial limits of conventional warfare, to

penetrate the political entity itself: the "political animal" that

Aristotle defined.

In effect,the human being should be considered the priority objective

in a political war. And conceived as the military target of guerrilla war,

the human being has his most critical point in his mind. Once his mind has

been reached, the"political animal" has been defeated, without necessarily

receiving bullets.

Guerrilla warfare is born and grows in the political environment; in

the constant combat to dominate that area of political mentality that is

inherent to all human beings and which collectively constitutes the

"environment" in which guerrilla warfare moves, and which is where

precisely its victory or failure is defined.

This conception of guerrilla warfare as political war turns

Psychological Operations into the decisive factor of the results. The

target, then, is the minds of the population, all the population: our

troops, the enemy troops and the civilian population.

This book is a manual for the training of guerrillas in psychological

operations, and its application to the concrete case of the Christian and

democratic crusade being waged in Nicaragua by the Freedom Commandos.

Welcome!

INTRODUCTION

1. Generalities

The purpose of this book is to introduce the guerrilla student to the

psychological operations techniques that will be of immediate and practical

value to him in guerrilla warfare. This section is introductory and

general; subsequent sections will cover each point set forth here in more

detail.

The nature of the environment of guerrilla warfare does not permit

sophisticated psychological operations, and it becomes necessary for the

chiefs of groups, chiefs of detachments and squadron leaders to have the

ability to carry out, with minimal instructions from the higher levels,

psychological action operations with the contacts that are thoroughly aware

of the situation, i.e. the foundations.

2. Combatant-Propagandist Guerrillas

In order to obtain the maximum results from the psychological

operations in guerrilla warfare, every combatant should be as highly

motivated to carry out propaganda face to face as he is a combatant. This

means that the individual political awareness of the guerrilla of the

reason for his struggle will be as acute as his ability to fight.

Such a political awareness and motivation is obtained through the

dynamic of groups and self-criticism, as a standard method of instruction

for the guerrilla training and operations. Group discussions raise the

spirit and improve the unity of thought of the guerrilla training and

operations. Group discussions raise the spirit and improve the unity of

thought of the guerrilla squads and exercise social pressure on the weak

members to carry out a better role in future training or in combative

action. Self-criticism is in terms of one's contribution or defects in his

contribution to the cause, to the movement, the struggle, etc.; and gives a

positive individual commitment to the mission of the group.

The desired result is a guerrilla who can persuasively justify his

actions when he comes into contact with any member of the People of

Nicaragua, and especially with himself and his fellow guerrillas in dealing

with the vicissitudes of guerrilla warfare. This means that every guerrilla

will be persuasive in his face-to-face communication - propagandist-

combatant - in his contact with the people; he should be able to give 5 or

10 logical reasons why, for example, a peasant should give him cloth,

needle and thread to mend his clothes. When the guerrilla behaves in this

manner, enemy propaganda will never succeed in making him an enemy in the

eyes of the people. It also means that hunger, cold, fatigue and insecurity

will have a meaning, psychologically, in the cause of the struggle due to

his constant orientation.

3. Armed Propaganda

Armed propaganda includes every act carried out, and the good

impression that this armed force causes will result in positive attitudes

in the population toward that force; and it does not include forced

indoctrination. Armed propaganda improves the behavior of the population

toward them, and it is not achieved by force.

This means that a guerilla armed unit in a rural town will not give

the impression that arms are their strength over the peasants, but rather

that they are the strength of the peasants against the Sandinista

government of repression. This is achieved through a close identification

with the people, as follows: hanging up weapons and working together with

them on their crops, in construction, in the harvesting of grains, in

fishing, etc.; explanations to young men about basic weapons, e.g. giving

them an unloaded weapon and letting them touch it, see it, etc.; describing

in a rudimentary manner its operation; describing with simple slogans how

weapons will serve the people to win their freedom; demanding the requests

by the people for hospitals and education, reducing taxes, etc.

All these acts have as their goal the creation of an identification of

the people with the weapons and the guerrillas who carry them, so that the

population feels that the weapons are, indirectly, their weapon to protect

them and help them in the struggle against a regime of oppression. Implicit

terror always accompanies weapons, since the people are internally "aware"

that they can be used against them, but as long as explicit coercion is

avoided, positive attitudes can be achieved with respect to the presence of

armed guerrillas within the population.

4. Armed Propaganda Teams

Armed Propaganda Teams (EPA) are formed through a careful selection of

persuasive and highly motivated guerrillas who move about within the

population, encouraging the people to support the guerrillas and put up

resistance against the enemy. It combines a high degree of political

awareness and the "armed" propaganda ability of the guerrillas toward a

planned, programmed, and controlled effort.

The careful selection of the staff, based on their persuasiveness in

informal discussions and their ability in combat, is more important than

their degree of education or the training program. The tactics of the Armed

Propaganda Teams are carried out covertly, and should be parallel to the

tactical effort in guerrilla warfare. The knowledge of the psychology of

the population is primary for the Armed Propaganda Teams, but much more

intelligence data will be obtained from an EPA program in the area of

operations.

5. Development and Control of the "Front" Organizations

The development and control of "front" (or facade) organizations is

carried out through subjective internal control at group meetings of

"inside cadres," and the calculations of the time for the fusion of these

combined efforts to be applied to the masses.

Established citizens-doctors, lawyers, businessmen, teachers, etc.-

will be recruited initially as "Social Crusaders" in typically "innocuous"

movements in the area of operations. When their "involvement" with the

clandestine organization is revealed to them, this supplies the

psychological pressure to use them as "inside cadres" in groups to which

they already belong or of which they can be members.

Then they will receive instruction in techniques of persuasion over

control of target groups to support our democratic revolution, through a

gradual and skillful process. A cell control system isolates individuals

from one another, and at the appropriate moment, their influence is used

for the fusion of groups in a united national front.

6. Control of Meetings and Mass Assemblies

The control of mass meetings in support of guerrilla warfare is

carried out internally through a covert commando element, bodyguards,

messengers, shock forces (initiators of incidents), placard carriers (also

used for making signals), shouters of slogans, everything under the control

of the outside commando element.

When the cadres are placed or recruited in organizations such as labor

unions, youth groups agrarian organizations or professional associations,

they will begin to manipulate the objectives of the groups. The

psychological apparatus of our movement through inside cadres prepares a

mental attitude which at the crucial moment can be turned into a fury of

justified violence.

Through a small group of guerrillas infiltrated within the masses this

can be carried out; they will have the mission of agitating by giving the

impression that there are many of them and that they have a large popular

backing. Using the tactics of a force of 200-300 agitators, a demonstration

can be created in which 10,000-20,000 persons take part.

7. Support of Contacts with Their Roots in Reality

The support of local contacts who are familiar with the deep reality

is achieved through the exploitation of the social and political weaknesses

of the target society, with propagandist-combatant guerrillas, armed

propaganda, armed propaganda teams, cover organizations and mass meetings.

The combatant-propagandist guerrilla is the result of a continuous

program of indoctrination and motivation. They will have the mission of

showing the people how great and fair our movement is in the eyes of all

Nicaraguans and the world. Identifying themselves with our people, they

will increase the sympathy towards our movement, which will result in

greater support of the population for the freedom commandos, taking away

support for the regime in power.

Armed propaganda will extend this identification process of the people

with the Christian guerrillas, providing converging points against the

Sandinista regime.

The Armed Propaganda Teams provide a several-stage program of

persuasive planning in guerrilla warfare in all areas of the country. Also,

these teams are the "eyes and ears" of our movement.

The development and control of the cover organizations in guerrilla

warfare will give our movement the ability to create a "whiplash" effect

within the population when the order for fusion is given. When the

infiltration and internal subjective control have been developed in a

manner parallel to other guerrilla activities, a comandante of ours will

literally be able to shake up the Sandinista structure, and replace it.

The mass assemblies and meetings are the culmination of a wide base

support among the population, and it comes about in the later phases of the

operation. This is the moment in which the overthrow can be achieved and

our revolution can become an open one, requiring the close collaboration of

the entire population of the country, and of contacts with their roots in

reality.

The tactical effort in guerrilla warfare is directed at the weaknesses

of the enemy and at destroying their military resistance capacity, and

should be parallel to a psychological effort to weaken and destroy their

sociopolitical capacity at the same time. In guerrilla warfare, more than

in any other type of military effort, the psychological activities should

be simultaneous with the military ones, in order to achieve the objectives

desired.

COMBATANT-PROPAGANDIST GUERRILLA

1. Generalities

The objective of this section is to familiarize the guerrilla with the

techniques of psychological operations, which maximizes the social-

psychological effect of a guerrilla movement, converting the guerrilla into

a propagandist, in addition to being a combatant. The nature of the

environment in guerrilla warfare does not permit sophisticated facilities

for psychological operations, so that use should be made of the effective

face-to-face persuasion of each guerrilla.

2. Political Awareness

The individual political awareness of the guerrilla, the reason for

his struggle, will be as important as his ability in combat. This political

awareness and motivation will be achieved:

~ By improving the combat potential of the guerrilla by improving

his motivation for fighting.

~ By the guerrilla recognizing himself as a vital tie between the

democratic guerrillas and the people, whose support is essential

for the subsistence of both.

~ By fostering the support of the population for the national

insurgence through the support for the guerrillas of the locale,

which provides a psychological basis in the population for

politics after the victory has been achieved.

~ By developing trust in the guerrillas and in the population, for

the reconstruction of a local and national government.

~ By promoting the value of participation by the guerrillas and the

people in the civic affairs of the insurrection and in the

national programs.

~ By developing in each guerrilla the ability of persuasion face-

to-face, at the local level, to win the support of the

population, which is essential for success in guerrilla warfare.

3. Group Dynamics

This political awareness-building and motivation are attained by the

use of group dynamics at the level of small units. The group discussion

method and self-criticism are a general guerrilla training and operations

technique.

Group discussions raise the spirit and increase the unity of thought

in small guerrilla groups and exercise social pressure on the weakest

members to better carry out their mission in training and future combat

actions. These group discussions will give special emphasis to:

~ Creating a favorable opinion of our movement. Through local and

national history, make it clear that the Sandinista regime is

"foreignizing," "repressive" and "imperialistic," and that even

though there are some Nicaraguans within the government, point

out that they are "puppets" of the power of the Soviets and

Cubans, i.e. of foreign power.

~ Always a local focus. Matters of an international nature will be

explained only in support of local events in the guerrilla

warfare.

~ The unification of the nation is our goal. This means that the

defeat of the Sandinista armed forces is our priority. Our

insurrectional movement is a pluralistic political platform from

which we are determined to win freedom, equality, a better

economy with work facilities, a higher standard of living, a true

democracy for all Nicaraguans without exception.

~ Providing to each guerrilla clear understanding about the

struggle for national sovereignty against Soviet-Cuban

imperialism. Discussion guides will lead the guerrillas so that

they will see the injustices of the Sandinista system.

~ Showing each guerrilla the need for good behavior to win the

support of the population. Discussion guides should convince the

guerrillas that the attitude and opinion of the population play a

decisive role, because victory is impossible without popular

support.

~ Self-criticism will be in constructive terms that will contribute

to the mission of the movement, and which will provide the

guerrillas with the conviction that they have a constant and

positive individual responsibility in the mission of the group.

The method of instruction will be:

a) division of the guerrilla force into squads for group

discussions, including command and support elements,

whenever the tactical situation permits it. The makeup of

the small units should be maintained when these groups are

designated.

b) Assignment of a political cadre in the guerrilla force to

each group to guide the discussion. The squad leader should

help the cadre to foster study and the expression of

thoughts. If there are not enough political cadres for each

squad or post, leaders should guide the discussions, and the

available cadres visit alternate groups.

c) It is appropriate for the cadre (or the leader) to guide

the discussion of a group to cover a number of points and to

reach a correct conclusion. The guerrillas should feel that

it was their free and own decision. The cadre should serve

as a private teacher. The cadre or leader will not act as a

lecturer, but will help the members of the group to study

and express their own opinions.

d) The political cadre will at the end of every discussion

make a summary of the principal points, leading them to the

correct conclusions. Any serious difference with the

objectives of the movement should be noted by the cadre and

reported to the comandante of the force. If necessary, a

combined group meeting will be held and the team of

political cadres will explain and rectify the

misunderstanding.

e) Democratic conduct by the political cadres: living,

eating and working with the guerrillas, and if possible,

fighting at their side, sharing their living conditions. All

of this will foster understanding and the spirit of

cooperation that will help in the discussion and exchange of

ideas.

f) Carry out group discussions in towns, and areas of

operations whenever possible with the civilian population,

and not limit them to camps or bases. This is done to

emphasize the revolutionary nature of the struggle and to

demonstrate that the guerrillas identified with the

objectives of the people move about within the population.

The guerrilla projects himself toward the people, as the

political cadre does toward the guerrilla, and they should

live, eat and work together to realize a unity of

revolutionary thought.

The principles for guerrilla and political-cadre group discussions

are:

~ Organize discussion groups at the post or squad level. A cadre

cannot be sure of the comprehension and acceptance of the

concepts and conclusions by guerrillas in large groups. In a

group of the size of a squad of 10 men, the judgement and control

of the situation is greater. In this way, all students will

participate in an exchange among them; the political leader, the

group leader, and also the political cadre. Special attention

will be given to the individual ability to discuss the objectives

of the insurrectional struggle. Whenever a guerrilla expresses

his opinion, he will be interested in listening to the opinions

of others, leading as a result to the unity of thought.

~ Combine the different points of view and reach an opinion or

common conclusion. This is the most difficult task of a political

guerrilla cadre. After the group discussions of the democratic

objectives of the movement, the chief of the team of political

cadres of the guerrilla force should combine the conclusions of

individual groups in a general summary. At a meeting with all the

discussion groups, the cadre shall provide the principal points,

and the guerrillas will have the opportunity to clarify or modify

their points of view. To carry this out, the conclusions will be

summarized in the form of slogans, wherever possible.

~ Face with honesty the national and local problems of our

struggle. The political cadres should always be prepared to

discuss solutions to the problems observed by the guerrillas.

During the discussions, the guerrillas should be guided by the

following three principles:

~ Freedom of thought.

~ Freedom of expression.

~ Concentration of thoughts on the objectives of the democratic

struggle.

The result desired is a guerrilla who in a persuasive manner can

justify all of his acts whenever he is in contact with any member of the

town/people, and especially with himself and with his guerrilla companions

by facing the vicissitudes of guerrilla warfare.

This means that every guerrilla will come to have effective face-to-

face persuasion as a combatant-propagandist in his contact with the people,

to the point of giving 5-10 logical reasons why, e.g. a peasant should give

him a piece of cloth, or a needle and thread to mend his clothes. When

behaves in this manner, no type of propaganda of the enemy will be able to

make a "terrorist" of him in the eyes of the people.

In addition, hunger, cold, fatigue and insecurity in the existence of

the guerrilla acquire meaning in the cause of the struggle due to the

constant psychological orientation.

4. Camp Procedures

Encamping the guerrilla units gives greater motivation, in addition to

reducing distractions, and increases the spirit of cooperation of small

units, relating the physical environment to the psychological one. The

squad chief shall establish the regular camping procedure. Once thy have

divested themselves of their packs, the chief will choose the appropriate

ground for camping. He should select land that predominates over the zone

with two or three escape routes. He will choose among his men and give them

responsibilities such as:

~ Clean the camp area.

~ Provide adequate drainage in case of rain. Also build some

trenches or holes for marksmen in case of emergency. In addition,

he will build a stove, which will be done by making some small

trenches and placing three rocks in place; in case the stove is

built on a pedestal, it will be filled with clay and rocks.

~ Build a windbreaking wall, which will be covered on the sides and

on the top with branches and leaves of the same vegetation of the

zones. This will serve for camouflaging and protecting it from

aerial visibility or from enemy patrols around.

~ Construct a latrine and a hole where waste and garbage will be

buried, which should be covered over at the time of abandoning

the camp.

~ Once the camp has been set up, it is recommended that a watchman

be positioned in the places of access at a prudent distance,

where the shout of alarm can be heard. In the same moment the

password will be established, which should be changed every 24

hours. The commander should establish ahead of time an alternate

meeting point, in case of having to abandon the camp in a hurried

manner, and they will be able to meet in the other already

established point, and they should warn the patrol that if at a

particular time they cannot meet at the established point, they

should have a third meeting point.

These procedures contribute to the motivation of the guerrilla and

improve the spirit of cooperation in the unit. The danger, sense of

insecurity, anxiety and daily concern in the life of a guerrilla require

tangible evidence of belonging in an order for him to keep up his spirit

and morale.

In addition to the good physical conditions in which the guerrilla

should find himself, good psychological conditions are necessary, for which

group discussions and becoming a self-critic are recommended, which will

greatly benefit the spirit and morale of the same.

Having broken camp with the effort and cooperation of everyone

strengthens the spirit of the group. The guerrilla will be inclined then

towards the unity of thought in democratic objectives.

5. Interaction with the People

In order to ensure popular support, essential for the good development

of guerrilla warfare, the leaders should induce a positive interaction

between the civilians and the guerrillas, through the principle of "live,

eat , and work with the people," and maintain control of their activities.

In group discussions, the leaders and political cadres should give emphasis

to positively identifying themselves with the people.

It is not recommendable to speak of military tactical plans in

discussions with civilians. The Communist foe should be pointed out as the

number one enemy of the people, and as a secondary threat against our

guerrilla forces.

Whenever there is a chance, groups of members should be chosen who

have a high political awareness and high disciplinary conduct in the work

to be carried out, in order to be sent to the populous areas in order to

direct the armed propaganda, where they should persuade the people through

dialogue in face-to-face confrontations, where these principles should be

followed:

~ Respect for human rights and others' property.

~ Helping the people in community work.

~ Protecting the people from Communist aggressions.

~ Teaching the people environmental hygiene, to read, etc., in

order to win their trust, which will lead to a better democratic

ideological preparation.

This attitude will foster the sympathy of the peasants for our

movement, and they will immediately become one of us, through logistical

support, coverage and intelligence information on the enemy or

participation in combat. The guerrillas should be persuasive through the

word and not dictatorial with weapons. If they behave in this way, the

people will feel respected, will be more inclined to accept our message and

will consolidate into popular support.

In any place in which tactical guerrilla operations are carried out in

populous areas, the squad should undertake psychological actions parallel

to these, and should proceed, accompany and consolidate the common

objective and explain to all the people about our struggle, explaining that

our presence is to give peace, liberty and democracy to all Nicaraguans

without exception, and explaining that our struggle is not against the

nationals but rather against Russian imperialism. This will serve to ensure

greater Psychological achievements which will increase the operations of

the future.

6. Conclusions

The nature of the environment in guerrilla warfare does not permit

sophisticated facilities for psychological operations, and the face-to-face

persuasion of the guerrilla combatant-propagandists with the people is an

effective and available tool which we should use as much as possible during

the process of the struggle.

ARMED PROPAGANDA

1. Generalities

Frequently a misunderstanding exists on "armed propaganda," that this

tactic is a compulsion of the people with arms. In reality, it does not

include compulsion, but the guerrilla should know well the principles and

methods of this tactic. The objective of this section is to give the

guerrilla student an understanding of the armed propaganda that should be

used, and that will be able to be applied in guerrilla warfare.

2. Close Identification with the People

Armed propaganda includes all acts carried out by an armed force,

whose results improve the attitude of the people toward this force, and it

does not include forced indoctrination. This is carried out by a close

identification with the people on any occasion. For example:

~ Putting aside weapons and working side by side with the peasants

in the countryside: building, fishing, repairing roofs,

transporting water, etc.

~ When working with the people, the guerrillas can use slogans such

as "many hands doing small things, but doing them together."

~ Participating in the tasks of the people, they can establish a

strong tie between them and the guerrillas and at the same time a

popular support for our movement is generated.

During the patrols and other operations around or in the midst of

villages, each guerrilla should be respectful and courteous with the

people. In addition he should move with care and always be well prepared to

fight, if necessary. But he should not always see all the people as

enemies, with suspicions or hostility. Even in war, it is possible to

smile, laugh or greet people. Truly, the cause of our revolutionary base,

the reason why we are struggling, is our people. We must be respectful to

them on all occasions that present themselves.

In places and situations wherever possible, e.g. when they are resting

during the march, the guerrillas can explain the operation of weapons to

the youths and young men. They can show them an unloaded rifle so that they

will learn to load it and unload it; their use, and aiming at imaginary

targets they are potential recruits for our forces.

The guerrillas should always be prepared with simple slogans in order

to explain to the people, whether in an intentional form or by chance, the

reason for the weapons.

"The weapons will be for winning freedom; the are for you."

"With weapons we can impose demands such as hospitals, schools, better

roads, and social services for the people, for you."

"Our weapons are, in truth, the weapons of the people, yours."

"With weapons we can change the Sandino-Communist regime and return to

the people a true democracy so that we will all have economic

opportunities."

All of this should be designed to create an identification of the

people with the weapons and the guerrillas who carry them. Finally, we

should make the people feel that we are thinking of them and that the

weapons are the people's, in order to help them and protect them from a

Communist, totalitarian, imperialist regime, indifferent to the needs of

the population.

3. Implicit and Explicit Terror

A guerrilla armed force always involves implicit terror because the

population, without saying it aloud, feels terror that the weapons may be

used against them. However, if the terror does not become explicit,

positive results can be expected.

In a revolution, the individual lives under a constant threat of

physical damage. If the government police cannot put an end to the

guerrilla activities, the population will lose confidence in the

government, which has the inherent mission of guaranteeing the safety of

citizens. However, the guerrillas should be careful not to become an

explicit terror, because this would result in a loss of popular support.

In the words of a leader of the Huk guerrilla movement of the

Philippine Islands: "The population is always impressed by weapons, not by

the terror that they cause, but rather by a sensation of strength/force. We

must appear before the people, giving them the message of the struggle."

This is, then, in a few words, the essence of armed propaganda.

An armed guerrilla force can occupy an entire town or small city that

is neutral or relatively passive in the conflict. In order to conduct the

armed propaganda in an effective manner, the following should be carried

out simultaneously:

~ Destroy the military or police installations and remove the survivors to

a "public place."

~ Cut all the outside lines of communications: cables, radio, messengers.

~ Set up ambushes in order to delay the reinforcements in all the possible

entry routes.

~ Kidnap all officials or agents of the Sandinista government and replace

them in "public Places" with military or civilian persons of trust to our

movement; in addition, carry out the following:

~ Establish a public tribunal that depends on the guerrillas, and cover the

town or city in order to gather the population for this event.

~ Shame, ridicule and humiliate the "personal symbols" of the government of

repression in the presence of the people and foster popular participation

through guerrillas within the multitude, shouting slogans and jeers.

~ Reduce the influence of individuals in tune with the regime, pointing out

their weaknesses and taking them out of the town, without damaging them

publicly.

~ Mix the guerrillas within the population and show very good conduct by

all members of the column, practicing the following:

Any article taken will be paid for with cash.

The hospitality offered by the people will be accepted and this

opportunity will be exploited in order to carry out face-to-face

persuasion about the struggle.

Courtesy visits should be made to the prominent persons and those with

prestige in the place, such as doctors, priests, teachers, etc.

The guerrillas should instruct the population that with the end of the

operative, and when the Sandinista repressive forces interrogate them,

they may reveal EVERYTHING about the military operation carried out.

For example, the type of weapons they use, how many men arrived, from

what direction they came and in what direction they left, in short,

EVERYTHING.

In addition, indicate to the population that at meetings or in private

discussion they can give the names of the Sandinista informants, who

will be removed together with the other officials of the government of

repression.

When a meeting is held, conclude it with a speech by one of the

leaders of guerrilla political cadres (the most dynamic), which includes

explicit references to:

The fact that the "enemies of the people" -- the officials or

Sandinista agents -- must not be mistreated in spite of their criminal

acts, although the guerrilla force may have suffered casualties, and that

this is done due to the generosity of the Christian guerrillas.

Give a declaration of gratitude for the "hospitality" of the

population, as well as let them know that the risks that they will run when

the Sandinistas return are greatly appreciated.

The fact that the Sandinista regime, although it exploits the people

with taxes, control of money, grains and all aspects of public life through

associations, which they are forced to become part of, will not be able to

resist the attacks of our guerrilla forces.

Make the promise to the people that you will return to ensure that the

"leeches" of the Sandinista regime of repression will not be able to hinder

our guerrillas from integrating with the population.

A statement repeated to the population to the effect that they can

reveal everything about this visit of our commandos, because we are not

afraid of anything or anyone, neither the Soviets nor the Cubans. Emphasize

that we are Nicaraguans, that we are fighting for the freedom of Nicaragua

and to establish a very Nicaraguan government.

4. Guerrilla Weapons Are The Strength of the People over an Illegal

Government

The armed propaganda in populated areas does not give the impression

that weapons are the power of the guerrillas over the people, but rather

that the weapons are the strength of the people against a regime of

repression. Whenever it is necessary to use armed force in an occupation or

visit to a town or village, guerrillas should emphasize making sure that

they:

~ Explain to the population that in the first place this is being done to

protect them, the people, and not themselves.

~ Admit frankly and publicly that this is an "act of the democratic

guerrilla movement," with appropriate explanations.

~ That this action, although it is not desirable, is necessary because the

final objective of the insurrection is a free and democratic society, where

acts of force are not necessary.

~ The force of weapons is a necessity caused by the oppressive system, and

will cease to exist when the "forces of justice" of our movement assume

control.

If, for example, it should be necessary for one of the advanced posts

to have to fire on a citizen who was trying to leave the town or city in

which the guerrillas are carrying out armed propaganda or political

proselytism, the following is recommended:

~ Explain that if that citizen had managed to escape, he would have alerted

the enemy that is near the town or city, and they could carry out acts of

reprisal such as rapes, pillage, destruction, captures, etc., it this way

terrorizing the inhabitants of the place for having given attention and

hospitalities to the guerrillas of the town.

~ If a guerrilla fires at an individual, make the town see that he was an

enemy of the people, and that they shot him because the guerrilla

recognized as their first duty the protection of citizens.

~ The command tried to detain the informant without firing because he, like

all Christian guerrillas, espouses nonviolence. Firing at the Sandinista

informant, although it is against his own will, was necessary to prevent

the repression of the Sandinista government against innocent people.

~ Make the population see that it was the repressive system of the regime

that was the cause of this situation, what really killed the informer, and

that the weapon fired was one recovered in combat against the Sandinista

regime.

~ Make the population see that if the Sandinista regime had ended the

repression, the corruption backed by foreign powers, etc., the freedom

commandos would not have had to brandish arms against brother Nicaraguans,

which goes against our Christian sentiments. If the informant hadn't tried

to escape he would be enjoying life together with the rest of the

population, because not have tried to inform the enemy. This death would

have been avoided if justice and freedom existed in Nicaragua, which is

exactly the objective of the democratic guerrilla.

5. Selective Use of Violence for Propagandistic Effects

It is possible to neutralize carefully selected and planned targets,

such as court judges, mesta judges, police and State Security officials,

CDS chiefs, etc. For psychological purposes it is necessary to gather

together the population affected, so that they will be present, take part

in the act, and formulate accusations against the oppressor.

The target or person should be chosen on the basis of:

~ The spontaneous hostility that the majority of the population feels

toward the target.

~ Use rejection or potential hatred by the majority of the population

affected toward the target, stirring up the population and making them see

all the negative and hostile actions of the individual against the people.

~ If the majority of the people give their support or backing to the target

or subject, do not try to change these sentiments through provocation.

~ Relative difficulty of controlling the person who will replace the

target.

The person who will replace the target should be chosen carefully,

based on:

~ Degree of violence necessary to carry out the change.

~ Degree of violence acceptable to the population affected.

~ Degree of predictable reprisal by the enemy on the population affected or

other individuals in the area of the target.

The mission to replace the individual should be followed by:

~ Extensive explanation within the population affected of the reason why it

was necessary for the good of the people.

~ Explain that Sandinista retaliation is unjust, indiscriminate, and above

all, a justification for the execution of this mission.

~ Carefully test the reaction of the people toward the mission, as well as

control this reaction, making sure that the populations reaction is

beneficial towards the Freedom Commandos.

6. Conclusions

Armed propaganda includes all acts executed and the impact achieved by

an armed force, which as a result produces positive attitudes in the

population toward this force, and it does not include forced

indoctrination. However, armed propaganda is the most effective available

instrument of a guerrilla force.

ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAMS (APTs)

1. Generalities

In contact with the very reality of their roots, in a psychological

operation campaign in guerrilla warfare, the comandantes will be able to

obtain maximum psychological results from an Armed Propaganda program. This

section is to inform the guerrilla student as to what Armed Propaganda

Teams are in the environment of guerrilla warfare.

2. Combination: Political Awareness and Armed Propaganda

The Armed Propaganda Teams combine political awareness-building with

armed propaganda, which will be carried out by carefully selected

guerrillas (preferably with experience in combat), for personal persuasion

within the population.

The selection of the staff is more important than the training,

because we cannot train guerrilla cadres just to show the sensations of

ardor and fervor, which are essential for person-to-person persuasion. More

important is the training of persons who are intellectually agile and

developed.

An Armed Propaganda Team includes from 6 to 10 members; this number or

a smaller number is ideal, since there is more camaraderie, solidarity and

group spirit. The themes to deal with are assimilated more rapidly and the

members react more rapidly to unforeseen situations.

In addition to the combination as armed propagandist-combatant each

member of the team should be well prepared to carry out permanent person-

to-person communication, face-to-face.

The leader of the group should be the commando who is the most highly

motivated politically and the most effective in face-to-face persuasion.

The position, hierarchy or range will not be decisive for carrying out that

function, but rather who is best qualified for communication with the

people.

The source of basic recruitment for guerrilla cadres will be the same

social groups of Nicaraguans to whom the psychological campaign is

directed, such as peasants, students, professionals, housewives, etc. The

campesinos (peasants) should be made to see that they do not have lands;

the workers that the State is putting an end to factories and industries;

the doctors, that they are being replaced by Cuban paramedics, and that as

doctors they cannot practice their profession due to lack of medicines. A

requirement for recruiting them will be their ability to express themselves

in public.

The selection of the personnel is more important than the training.

The political awareness-building and the individual capabilities of

persuasion will be shown in the group discussions for motivation of the

guerrilla as a propagandist-combatant chosen as cadres to organize them in

teams, that is, those who have the greatest capacity for this work.

The training of guerrillas for Armed Propaganda Teams emphasizes the

method and not the content. A two-week training period is sufficient if the

recruitment is done in the form indicated. If a mistaken process of

recruitment has been followed, however good the training provided, the

individual chosen will not yield a very good result.

The training should be intensive for 14 days, through team

discussions, alternating the person who leads the discussion among the

members of the group.

The subjects to be dealt with will be the same, each day a different

theme being presented, for a varied practice.

The themes should refer to the conditions of the place and the meaning

that they have for the inhabitants of the locality, such as talking of

crops, fertilizers, seeds, irrigation of crops, etc. They can also include

the following topics:

~ Sawed wood, carpenters' tools for houses or other buildings.

~ Boats, roads, horses, oxen for transportation, fishing,

agriculture.

~ Problems that they may have in the place with residents, offices

of the regime, imposed visitors, etc.

~ Force labor, service in the militia.

~ Forced membership in Sandinista groups, such as women's clubs,

youth associations, workers' groups, etc.

~ Availability and prices of consumer articles and of basic needs

in the grocery stores and shops of the place.

~ Characteristics of education in the public schools.

~ Anxiety of the people over the presence of Cuban teachers in the

schools and the intrusion of politics, i.e. using them for

political ends and not educational ones as should be.

~ Indignation over the lack of freedom of worship, and persecution,

of which priests are victims; and over the participation of

priests such as Escoto and Cardenal in the Sandinista government,

against the explicit orders of his Holiness, the Pope.

NOTE: Members of the team can develop other themes.

The target groups for the Armed Propaganda Teams are not the persons

with sophisticated political knowledge, but rather those whose opinion are

formed from what they see and hear. The cadres should use persuasion to

carry out their mission. Some of the persuasive methods that they can use

are the following:

Interior Group/Exterior Group. It is a principle of psychology that we

humans have the tendency to form personal associations from "we" and "the

others," or "we" and "they", "friends" and "enemies," "fellow countrymen"

and "foreigners," "mestizos" and "gringos."

The Armed Propaganda Team can use this principle in its activities, so

that it is obvious that the "exterior" groups ("false" groups) are those of

the Sandinista regime, and that the "interior" groups ("true" groups) that

fight for the people are the Freedom Commandos.

We should inculcate this in the people in a subtle manner so that

these feelings seem to be born of themselves, spontaneously.

"Against" is much easier than "for." It is a principle of political

science that it is easier to persuade the people to vote against something

or someone than to persuade them to vote in favor of something or someone.

Although currently the regime has not given the Nicaraguan people the

opportunity to vote, it is known that the people will vote in opposition,

so that the Armed Propaganda Teams can use this principle in favor of our

insurrectional struggle. They should ensure that this campaign is directed

specifically against the government or its sympathizers, since the people

should have specific targets for their frustrations.

Primary Groups and Secondary Groups. Another principle of sociology is

that we humans forge or change our opinions from two sources: primarily,

through our association with our family, comrades, or intimate friends; and

secondarily, through distant associations such as acquaintances in

churches, clubs or committees, labor unions or governmental organizations.

The Armed Propaganda Team cadres should join the first groups in order to

persuade them to follow the policies of our movement, because it is from

this type of group that the opinions or changes of opinion come.

Techniques of Persuasion in Talks or Speeches:

Be Simple and Concise. You should avoid the use of difficult words or

expressions and prefer popular words and expressions, i.e. the language of

the people. In dealing with a person you should make use of concise

language, avoiding complicated words. It is important to remember that we

use oratory to make our people understand the reason for our struggle, and

not to show off our knowledge.

Use Lively and Realistic Examples. Avoid abstract concepts, such as

are used in universities in the advanced years, and in place of them, give

concrete examples such as children playing, horses galloping, birds in

flight, etc.

Use Gestures to Communicate. Communication, in addition to being

verbal, can be through gestures, such as using our hands expressively, back

movements, facial expressions, focusing of our look and other aspects of

"body language," projecting the individual personality in the message.

Use the Appropriate Tone of Voice. If, on addressing the people, you

talk about happiness, a happy tone should be used. If you talk of something

sad, the tone of the voice should be one of sadness; on talking of a heroic

or brave act, the voice should be animated, etc.

Above All, Be Natural, Imitation of others should be avoided, since

the people, especially simple people, easily distinguish a fake. The

individual personality should be projected when addressing the population.

3. "Eyes and Ears" Within the Population

The amount of information for intelligence that will be generated by

the deployment of the Armed Propaganda Teams will allow us to cover a large

area with our commandos, who will become the eyes and ears of our movement

within the population:

The combined reports of an Armed Propaganda Team will provide us with

exact details on the enemy activities.

The intelligence information obtained by the Armed Propaganda Teams

should be reported to the chiefs. However, it is necessary to emphasize

that the first mission of the Armed Propaganda Teams is to carry out

psychological operations, not to obtain data for intelligence.

Any intelligence report will be made through the outside contact of

the Armed Propaganda Team, in order not to compromise the population.

The Armed Propaganda cadres are able to do what others in a guerrilla

campaign cannot do: determine personally the development or deterioration

of the popular support and the sympathy or hostility that the people feel

toward our movement.

The Armed Propaganda Team program, in addition to being very effective

psychologically, increases the guerrilla capacity in obtaining and using

information.

In addition, the Armed Propaganda cadre will report to his superior

the reaction of the people to the radio broadcasts, the insurrectional

flyers, or any other means of propaganda of ours.

Expressions or gestures of the eyes, or face, the tone and strength of

the voice, and the use of the appropriate words greatly affect the face-to-

face persuasion of the people.

With the intelligence reports supplied by the Armed Propaganda Teams,

the comandantes will be able to have exact knowledge of the popular

support, which they will make use of in their operations.

4. Psychological Tactics, Maximum Flexibility

Psychological tactics will have the greatest flexibility within a

general plan, permitting a continuous and immediate adjustment of the

message, and ensuring that an impact is caused on the indicated target

group at the moment in which it is the most susceptible.

Tactically, an Armed Propaganda Equipment program should cover the

majority and if possible all of the operational area. The communities in

which this propaganda is carried out should not necessarily form political

units with an official nature. A complete understanding of their structure

or organization is not necessary because the cadres will work by applying

socio-political action and not academic theory.

The target populations of the Armed Propaganda Teams will be chosen

for being part of the operational area, and not for their size or amount of

land.

The objective should be the people and not the territorial area.

In this respect, each work team will be able to cover some six towns

approximately, in order to develop popular support for our movement.

The Team should always move in a covert manner within the towns of

their area.

They should vary their route radically, but not their itinerary,. This

is so that the inhabitants who are cooperating will be dependent on their

itinerary, i.e., the hour in which they can frequently contact them to give

them the information.

The danger of betrayal or an ambush can be neutralized by varying the

itinerary a little, using different routes, as well as arriving or leaving

without previous warning.

Whenever the surprise factor is used, vigilance should be kept in

order to detect the possible presence of hostile elements.

No more than three consecutive days should be spent in a town.

The limit of three days has obvious tactical advantages, but it also

has a psychological effect on the people, on seeing the team as a source of

current and up-to-date information. Also, it can overexpose the target

audience and cause a negative reaction.

Basic tactical precautions should be taken. This is necessary for

greater effectiveness, as was indicated in dealing with the subject of

"Armed Propaganda," and when it is carried out discreetly, it increases the

respect of the people for the team and increases their credibility.

The basic procedures are: covert elements that carry out vigilance

before and after the departure and in intervals. There should be two at

least, and they should meet at a predetermined point upon a signal, or in

view of any hostile action.

The team's goal is to motivate the entire population of a place, but

to constantly remain aware that defined target groups exist within this

general configuration of the public.

Although meetings may be held in the population, the cadres should

recognize and keep in contact with the target groups, mixing with them

before, during and after the meeting. The method for holding this type of

meeting was included in the topic "Armed Propaganda," and will be covered

in greater detail under the title "Control of Mass Meetings and

Demonstrations."

The basic focus of the Armed Propaganda cadres should be on the

residents of the town, where their knowledge as formers of opinion can be

applied.

In the first visits of identification with the inhabitants, the

guerrilla cadres will be courteous and humble. They can work in the fields

or in any other form in which their abilities can contribute to the

improvement of the living style of the inhabitants of the place, winning

their trust and talking with them; helping to repair the fences of their

cattle; the cleaning of the same, collaborating in the vaccination of their

animals; teaching them to read, i.e., closely together in all the tasks of

the peasant or the community.

In his free time, our guerrilla should mix in with the community

groups and participate with them in pastoral activities, parties,

birthdays, and even in wakes or burials of the members of said community;

he will try to converse with both adults and adolescents. He will try to

penetrate to the heart of the family, in order to win the acceptance and

trust of all of the residents of that sector.

The Armed Propaganda Team cadres will give ideological training,

mixing these instructions with folkloric songs, and at the same time he

will tell stories that have some attraction, making an effort to make them

refer to heroic acts of our ancestors. He will also try to tell stories of

heroism of our combatants in the present struggle so that listeners try to

imitate them. It is important to let them know that there are other

countries in the world where freedom and democracy cause those governing to

be concerned over the well-being of their people, so that the children have

medical care and free education; where also they are concerned that

everyone have work and food, and all freedoms such as those of religion,

association and expression; where the greatest objective of the government

is to keep its people happy.

The cadres should not make mention of their political ideology during

the first phase of identification with the people, and they should orient

their talks to things that are pleasing to the peasants or the listeners,

trying to be as simple as possible in order to be understood.

The tactical objectives for identification with the people are the

following:

To establish tight relations through identification with the people,

through their very customs.

To determine the basic needs and desires of the different target

groups.

To discover the weaknesses of the governmental control.

Little by little, to sow the seed of democratic revolution, in order

to change the vices of the regime towards a new order of justice and

collective well-being.

In the motivation of the target groups, by the Armed Propaganda Teams,

the cadre should apply themes of "true" groups and themes of "false"

groups. The true group will correspond to the target group and the false

one to the Sandinista regime.

For the economic interest groups, such as small businessmen and

farmers, it should be emphasized that their potential progress is "limited"

by the Sandinista government, that resources are scarcer and scarcer, the

earnings/profits minimal, taxes high, etc. This can be applied to

entrepreneurs of transportation and others.

For the elements ambitious for power and social positions, it will be

emphasized that they will never be able to belong to the governmental

social class, since they are hermetic in their circle of command. Example,

the nine Sandinista leaders do not allow other persons to participate in

the government, and they hinder the development of the economic and social

potential of those like him, who have desires of overcoming this, which is

unjust and arbitrary.

Social and intellectual criticisms. They should be directed at the

professionals, professors, teachers, priests, missionaries, students and

others. Make them see that their writings, commentaries or conversations

are censored, which does not make it possible to correct these problems.

Once the needs and frustrations of the target groups have been