An article by Carl Oglesby

William Shirer closed his 1960 masterpiece, The Rise

and Fall of the Third Reich, with the judgment that

the Nazi regime “had passed into history,”1 but we

cannot be so confident today. On the contrary, the

evidence as of 1990 is that World War II did not end

as Shirer believed it did, That Nazism did not

surrender unconditionally and disappear, that indeed

it finessed a limited but crucial victory over the

Allies, a victory no less significant for having been

kept a secret from all but the few Americans who were

directly involved.

The Odessa and its Mission Hitler continued to rant of

victory, but after Germany’s massive defeat in the

battle of Stalingrad in mid-January 1943, the realists

of the German General Staff (OKW) were all agreed that

their game was lost. Defeat at Stalingrad meant, at a

minimum, that Germany could not win the war in the

East that year. This in turn means that the Nazis

would have to keep the great preponderance of their

military forces tied down on the eastern front and

could not redeploy them to the West, where the

Anglo-American invasion of Italy would occur that

summer. Apparently inspired by the Soviet victory,

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Prime Minister

Winston Churchill announced at Casablanca, on January

24, 1943, their demand for Germany’s unconditional

surrender and the complete de-Nazification of Europe.2

Within the German general staff two competing groups

formed around the question of what to do: one led by

Heinrich Himmler the other by Martin Bormann.3

Himmler was chief of the SS (Schutzstaffel,

protective echelon“), the blackshirted core of the

Nazi party that emerged as Hitler’s bodyguard in the

late 1920s and grew into the most powerful of the Nazi political institutions. After the failure of the attempted military coup of July 20, 1944, which wounded but did not kill Hitler, the SS seized all power and imposed a furious blood purge of the armed services in which some seven thousand were arrested and nearly five thousand.4 The SS was at that point the only organ of the Nazi state.

Himmler’s plan for dealing with the grim situation

facing Nazism found its premise in Hitler’s belief

that the alliance between “the ultra-capitalists” of

the U.S. and “the ultra-Marxists” of the Soviet Union

was politically unstable. “Even now they are at

loggerheads,” said Hitler. “If we can now deliver a

few more blows, this artificially bolstered common

front may suddenly collapse with a gigantic clap of

thunder.”5 Himmler believed that this collapse would

occur and that the U.S. would then consider the

formation of a new anti-soviet alliance with Nazi

Germany. The Nazis Would then negotiate “a separate

peace” with the United States, separate from any peace

with the USSR, with which Germany would remain at war,

now joined against the Soviets by the United States.

But Martin Bormann, who was even more powerful than

Himmler, did not accept the premise of the

separate-peace idea. Bormann was an intimate of

Hitler’s, the deputy fuhrer and the head of the Nazi

Party, thus superior to Himmler in rank. Bormann

wielded additional power as Hitler’s link to the

industrial and financial cartels that ran the Nazi

economy and was particularly close to Hermann Schmitz,

chief executive of I.G. Farben, the giant chemical

firm that was Nazi Germany’s greatest industrial

power.

 

With the support of Schmitz, Bormann rejected

Himmler’s separate-peace strategy on the ground that

it was far too optioptimistic.6 The Allied military

advantage was too great, Bormann believed, for

Roosevelt to be talked into a separate peace.

Roosevelt, after all, had taken the lead in

proclaiming the Allies’ demand for Germany’s

unconditional surrender and total de-Nazification.

Bormann reasoned, rather, that the Nazi’s best hope of surviving military defeat lay within their own resources, chief of which was the cohesion of tens of thousands of SS men for whom the prospect of surrender could offer only the gallows.

 

Bormann and Schmitz developed a more aggressive

self-contained approach to the problem of the looming

military defeat. the central concept of which was that

large numbers of Nazis would have to leave Europe and

at least for a time, find places in the world in which

to recover their strength. There were several

possibilities in Latin America, most notably Argentina

and Paraguay; South Africa, Egypt, and Indonesia were

also attractive rear areas in which to retreat.7

After the German defeat in the battle of Normandy in

June 1944, Bormann took the First external steps

toward implementing concrete plans for the Nazis’

great escape.

An enormous amount of Nazi treasure had to be moved

out of Europe and made safe. This treasure was

apparently divided into several caches, of which the

one at the Reichsbank in Berlin included almost three

tons of gold (much of it the so-called tooth-gold from

the slaughter camps) as well as silver, platinum, tens

of thousands of carats of precious stones, and perhaps

a billion dollars in various currencies.8

There were industrial assets to be expatriated,

including large tonnages of specialty steel and

certain industrial machinery as well as blue-prints

critical to the domination of certain areas of

manufacturing.

 

Key Nazi companies needed to be relicensed outside

Germany in order to escape the reach of

war-reparations claims. And tens of thousands of Nazi war criminals, almost all of them members of the SS, needed help to escape Germany and safely regroup in foreign colonies capable of providing security and livelihoods.

For help with the first three of these tasks, Bormann

convened a secret meeting of key German industrialists

on August 10, 1944, at the Hotel Maison Rouge in

Strasbourg.9 One part of the minutes of this meeting

states:

The [Nazi] Party is ready to supply large amounts of

money to those industrialists who contribute to the

post-war organization abroad. In return, the Party

demands all financial reserves which have already been transferred abroad or may later be transferred, so that after the defeat a strong new Reich can be built.10

The Nazi expert in this area was Hitter’s one-time

financial genius and Minister of the Economy, Dr.

Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht, available to Bormann

even though he was in prison on suspicion of

involvement in the anti-Hitler coup of 1944. According

to a U.S. Treasury Department report of 1945, at least

750 enterprises financed by the Nazi Party had been

set up outside Germany by the end of the war. These

firms were capable of generating an annual income of approximately $30 million, all of it available to Nazi causes.11 It was Schacht’s ability to finesse the legalities of licensing and ownership that brought this situation about.12

 

Organizing the physical removal of the Nazis’ material

assets and the escape of SS personnel were the tasks

of the hulking Otto Skorzeny, simultaneously an

officer of the SS, the Gestapo and the Waffen SS as

well as Hitler’s “favorite commando.”13 Skorzeny

worked closely with Bormann and Schacht in

transporting the Nazi assets to safety outside Europe

and in creating a network of SS escape routes (“rat

lines”) that led from all over Germany to the Bavarian

city of Memmingen, then to Rome, then by sea to a

number of Nazi retreat colonies set up in the global

south.

 

The international organization created to accommodate

Bormann’s plans is most often called “The Odessa,” a

German acronym for “Organization of Veterans of the

SS.” It has remained active as a shadowy presence

since the war and may indeed constitute Nazism’s most

notable organizational achievement. But we must

understand that none of Bormann’s, Skorzeny’s, and

Schacht’s well-laid plans would have stood the least

chance of success had it not been for a final

component of their organization, one not usually

associated with the Odessa at all but very possibly

the linchpin of the entire project.

Enter Gehlen

This final element of the Odessa was the so-called

Gehlen Organization (the Org), the Nazi intelligence

system that sold itself to the U.S. at the end of the

war. It was by far the most audacious, most critical,

and most essential part of the entire Odessa

undertaking. The literature on the Odessa and that on

the Gehlen Organization, however, are two different

things. No writer in the field Of Nazi studies has yet explicitly associated the two, despite the fact that General Reinhard Gehlen was tied politically as well as personally with Skorzeny and Schacht. Moreover, Gehlen’s fabled post-war organzation was in large part staffed by SS Nazis who are positively identified with the Odessa, men such as the infamous Franz Alfred Six and Emil Augsburg of the Wannsee Institute. An even more compelling reason for associating Gehlen with the Odessa is that, withought his organization as a screen, the various Odessa projects would have been directly exposed to American intelligence. If the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) had not been neutralized by the Gehlen ploy, the Odessa’s great escape scheme would have been discovered and broken up.

 

At 43, Brigadier General Reinhard Gehlen was a stiff, unprepossessing man of pounds when he presented himself for surrender at the U.S. command center in Fischhausen. But there was nothing small about his ego. “I am head of the section Foreign Armies East in German Army Headquarters,” he announced to the GI at the desk. “I have information to give of the highest importance to your government.” The GI was not impressed, however, and Gehlen spent weeks stewing in a POW compound before an evident Soviet eagerness to find him finally aroused the Americans’ attention.14

Gehlen became chief of the Third Reich’s Foreign

Armies East (FHO), on April 1, 1942. He was thus

responsible for Germany’s military intelligence

operations throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet

Union. His FHO was connected in this role with a

number of secret fascist organizations in the

countries to Germany’s east. These included Stepan

Bandera’s “B Faction” of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN/B),15 Romania’s Iron Guard,16 the Ustachis of Yugoslavia,17 the Vanagis of Latvia18 and, after the summer of 1942, “Vlassov’s Army,”19 the band of defectors from Soviet Communism marching behind former Red hero General Andrey Vlassov. Later on in the war, Gehlen placed one of his top men in control of Foreign Armies West, which broadened his power; and then after Admiral Wilhelm Canaris was purged and his Abwehr intelligence service cannibalized by the SS, Gehlen became in effect Nazi Germany’s over-all top intelligence chief.

 

The Great Escape

In December 1943, at the latest,

Gehlen reached the same conclusion about the war that

had come upon Bormann, Schacht, Skorzeny, and Himmler.

Germany was losing and could do nothing about it.

Several months later, Gehlen says, he began quietly

discussing the impending loss with a few close

associates. As he writes in his memoir: “Early

in-October 1944 I told my more intimate colleagues

that I considered the war was lost and we must begin

thinking of the future. We had to think ahead and plan

for the approaching catastrophe.”21

 

Gehlen’s strategic response to Gotterdammerung was a

kind of fusion of Himmler’s philosophy with Bormann’s

more pessimistic Odessa line: “My view,” he writes,

“was that there would be a place even for Germany in a

Europe rearmed for defense against Communism.

Therefore we must set our sights on the Western

powers, and give ourselves two objectives: to help

defend against Communist expansion and to recover and

reunify Germany’s lost territories.”22

Just as Bormann, Skorzeny, and Schacht were beginning

to execute their escape plans, so too was Gehlen:

“Setting his sights on the Western powers,” and in

particular on the United States, Gehlen pursued the

following strategic rationale: When the alliance

between the United States and the USSR collapsed, as

it was bound to do upon Germany’s defeat, the United

States would discover a piercing need for a

top-quality intelligence service in Eastern Europe and

inside the Soviet Union. It did not have such a

service of its own, and the pressures of erupting

East-West conflict would not give it time to develop

one from scratch. Let the United States therefore

leave the assets assembled by Gehlen and the FHO

intact. Let the United States not break up Gehlen’s relationship with East European fascist groups. Let the United States pick up Gehlen’s organization and put it to work for the West, the better to prevail in its coming struggle against a Soviet Union soon to become its ex-ally.

Gehlen brought his top staff people into the planning

for this amazing proposal. Together, during the last

months of the war, while Hitler was first raging at

Gehlen for his “defeatist” intelligence reports, then

promoting him to the rank of brigadier general, then

at last firing him altogether (but promoting into the

FHO directorship one of Gehlen’s co-conspirators),

Gehlen and his staff carefully prepared their huge

files on East Europe and the Soviet Union and moved

them south into the Bavarian Alps and buried them. At

the same time, Gehlen began building the ranks of the

FHO intelligence agents. The FH0 in fact was the only organization in the whole of the Third Reich that was actually recruiting new members as the war was winding down.23 SS men who knew they would be in trouble when the Allied forces arrived now came flocking to the FHO, knowing that it was the most secure place for them to be when the war finally ended.24

When Gehlen’s plans were complete and his preparations

all concluded, he divided his top staff into three

separate groups and moved them (as Skorzeny was doing

at the same time) into prearranged positions in

Bavaria. Gehlen himself was in place before the German surrender on May 7, hiding comfortably in a well-stocked chalet in a mountain lea called Misery Meadow. Besides Gehlen, there were eight others in the Misery Meadow group, including two wounded men and three young women. For three weeks, maintaining radio contact with the two other groups, Gehlen and his colleagues stayed on the mountain, waiting for the American army to appear in the valley far below. “These days of living in the arms of nature were truly enchanting,” he wrote. “We had grown accustomed to the peace, and our ears were attuned to nature’s every sound.”25

 

Destruction of the OSS

Gehlen was still communing with nature when William Donovan, chief of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), arrived in Nuremberg from Washington, dispatched by the new president to assist Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson. Harry S. Truman had made Jackson the United States’s chief prosecutor with the International Military Tribunal (IMT),

established to try the Nazis’ principal military

leaders. Donovan’s OSS was to function as an

investigative arm of the IMT. By the last half of the war if not before, President Roosevelt and Donovan were convinced that the U.S. needed a permanent intelligence service and that this service, like the OSS, should be civilian rather than military. They were convinced too that the OSS should be its foundation. On October 31, 1944, Roosevelt directed Donovan to prepare a memo on how such a

service should be organized.26

 

Donovan consulted on this assignment with his

colleague Allen Dulles, a force unto himself as

wartime chief of OSS operations in Bern. Dulles

advised Donovan to placate the military by proposing

that the new agency be placed automatically under

military command in time of war.27 Donovan’s proposal incorporated this idea,28 but only in order to state all the more strongly the case for civilian control and for making the OSS the basis of the new organization. As he wrote in his memo to Roosevelt of November 18, 1944, “There are common-sense reasons why you may desire to lay the keel of the ship at once…. We now have [in the OSS] the trained and specialized personnel needed for such a task, and this talent should not be dispersed.”29

 

Donovan proposed establishment of a civilian

intelligence service responsible directly to the

President and the Secretary of State, the chief

mission of which would be to support the President in

foreign policy. Except for the civilian Secretaries of

War and the Navy, Donovan’s plan did not even include

a place for military representation on the advisory

board, and he was careful to specify that the advisory

board would merely advise and not control. The new

service was to be all-powerful in its field, being

responsible for “coordination of the functions of all intelligence agencies of the Government.” The Donovan intelligence service, in other words, would directly and explicitly dominate the Army’s G-2 and the Navy’s ONI.30

Naturally, therefore, the Donovan plan drew an intense

attack from the military. One G-2 officer called it

“cumbersome and Possibly dangerous.”31 Another

referred to the OSS as “a bunch of faggots.”32 Nor was

the FBI’s J. Edgar Hoover silent. Hoover had fought

creation of the OSS perhaps more bitterly than the

military and had insisted throughout the war on

maintaining an FBI intelligence network in Latin

America despite the fact that this was supposed to be

READ  2007: NWO CODE FOR ASSASSINATION by CIA SS

OSS turf.33

Certain elements within Army intelligence were not

only opposed to Donovan’s plan but were also beginning

to formulate their own notions of what a post-war

intelligence system should be like.

 

Roosevelt sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff ultra-secret

copies of Donovan’s proposal along with Roosevelt’s

own draft executive order to implement it. On January

1, 1945, the Chiefs formally reported to Roosevelt

their extreme dissatisfaction with this scheme and

leaked Donovan’s memo to four right-wing newspapers,

which leapt to the attack with blaring headlines

accusing FDR and Donovan of conspiring to create “a

super Gestapo.” This attack put the Donovan plan on

hold, and the death of FDR on April 12, 1945 destroyed

it.34

In early May 1945, president for less than a month,

Truman made the OSS the American component of the

investigative arm of the IMT. It is one of the

fascinating conjunctions of this story that Donovan

should have left for Nuremberg just as Gehlen was

coming down from his mountain. It is one of its riper

ironies that Donovan would soon resign from Jackson’s

staff in a disagreement over trying German officers as

war criminals, which Donovan objected to but Jackson

and Truman sup- ported.35 Had Donovan lent his

energies to the trial of Nazis within the German

officer corps, he might have confronted the very

adversaries who would shortly take his place in the

American intelligence system, not only militarizing

it, but Nazifying it as well.

 

Gehlen Makes his Move

Gehlen had been on the mountain

for exactly three weeks and the war had been over for

almost two weeks when he decided on May 19 that it was

time to make contact. He left the three women and the

two wounded men at Misery Meadow and with his four

aides began the decent to the valley town of

Fischhausen on Lake Schliersee.

 

On the same day Soviet commissioners far to the north

at Flensburg demanded that the United States hand over

Gehlen as well as his files on the USSR. This was the

first the U.S. command had heard of Gehlen.36

Gehlen and company took their time, staying three days

with the parents of one of his aides and communicating

by radio with those who had remained at Misery Meadow.

On May 22, Gehlen at last decided the moment was

right. He and his aides marched into the Army command

center and represented themselves to the desk officer,

a Captain John Schwarzwalder, to whom Gehlen spoke his

prepared speech:

“I am head of the Section Foreign Armies East in

German Army headquarters. I have information to give

of the highest importance to your government.”

Schwarzwalder had Gehlen and his group jeeped to

Miesbach where there was a[n] OSS detachment. There

Gehlen once again gave his speech, this time to a

Captain Marian Porter: “I have information of the

greatest importance for your supreme commander.”

Porter replied, “So have they all,” and shunted him

and his cohorts off to the prison camp at Salzburg.

Gehlen’s disappointment at this reception was keen and

his biographers all say he never forgot it, “lapsing,”

as one puts it, “into near despair” as he “presented

the strange paradox of a spy-master thirsting for

recognition by his captors.”37

 

Recognition was inevitable, however, since the CIC was

trying to find him. By mid June at the latest, his

name was recognized by a G-2 officer, Colonel William

H. Quinn, who had Gehlen brought to Augsburg for his

first serious interrogation. Quinn was the first

American to whom Gehlen presented his proposal and

told of his staff dispersed at several camps in the

mountains as well as the precious buried archives of

the FHO. Unlike Captain Porter, Colonel Quinn was

impressed. He promptly passed Gehlen up the command

chain to General Edwin L. Sibert.

 

Sibert later recalled, “I had a most excellent

impression of him at once.” Gehlen immediately began

educating him as to the actual aims of the Soviet

Union and its display of military might.” As Sibert

told a journalist years later, “With her present armed

forces potential, he [Gehlen] continued, Russia could

risk war with the West and the aim of such a war would

be the occupation of West Germany.”38

Acting without orders, Sibert listened to Gehlen for

several days before informing Eisenhower’s chief of

staff, General Walter Bedell Smith.39 Smith and Sibert

then continued to develop their relationship with

Gehlen secretly, choosing not to burden Eisenhower

with knowledge of what they were doing “in order not

to compromise him in his relations with the

Soviets.”40 Eisenhower in fact had strictly forbidden

U.S. fraternization with Germans.

 

Gehlen was encouraged to resume contact with his FHO

comrades who were still at large in Bavaria, releasing

them from their vow of silence. Gehlen was

sufficiently confident of his American relationships

by this time that he dug up his buried files and, in

special camps, put his FH0 experts to work preparing

detailed reports on the Red Army for his American

captors. Well before the end of June he and his

comrades were “discharged from prisoner of war status

so that we could move around at will.”42 They were

encouraged to form a unit termed a “general staff

cell” first within G-2’s Historical Research Section,

then later in the Seventh Army’s Intelligence Center

in Wiesbaden, where they worked in private quarters

and were treated as VIPs.43

 

Indeed, a partly declassified CIA document

recapitulated this story in the early 1970s, noting at

this time:

Gehlen met with Admiral Karl Dognitz, who had been

appointed by Hitler as his successor during the last

days of the Third Reich. Gehlen and the Admiral were

now in a U.S. Army VIP prison camp in Wiesbaden;

Gehlen sought and received approval from Doenitz

too!44

 

In other words, the German chain of command was still

in effect, and it approved of what Gehlen was doing

with the Americans.

 

Gehlen’s biographers are under the impression that it

took six weeks for someone in European G-2 to notice

and recognize Gehlen in the POW cage, that Sibert did

not tell Smith about finding him until the middle of

August, and that it was much later still before Sibert

and Smith conspired to circumvent Eisenhower to

communicate their excitement about Gehlen to someone

at the Pentagon presumably associated with the Joint

Chiefs of Staff.45 But documents released in the 1980s

show that this part of Gehlen’s story raced along much

more quickly. Already on June 29, in fact, the

Pentagon had informed Eisenhower’s European command

that the War Department wanted to see Gehlen in

Washington.46

It was a fast time. By no later than August 22, one of

Gehlen’s top associates, Hermann Baum was forming what

would become the intelligence and counterintelligence

sections of Gehlen’s new organization. Gehlen himself,

with retinue, was departing for Washington in General

Bedell Smith’s DC-3 for high-level talks with American

military and intelligence officials. And the whole

concept of the deal he was about to offer his

conquerors had been approved by a Nazi chain of

command that was still functioning despite what the

world thought and still does think was the Nazis’

unconditional surrender.47

Gehlen arrived in Washington on August 24 with six of

his top FHO aides and technical experts in tow.48

World War II had been over about a week, the war in

Europe about three and a half months.

 

The Secret Treaty of Fort Hunt

As Gehlen and his six men were en route from Germany to Washington,Donovan’s OSS troubles became critical. On August 23, Admiral William Leahy, chief of the JCS, the

President’s national security adviser and a man who

despised Donovan, advised Truman to order his budget

director Harold Smith to begin a study of the

intelligence question. Stating “this country wanted no

Gestapo under any guise or for any reason.”49 Truman

may not have known that the Gestapo’s Odessa heirs

were landing in the lap of the Pentagon even as he

spoke. Smith in any case responded to Truman’s

directive by asking Donovan for his OSS demobilization

plans. Now, too late. Donovan tried to fight. The

Gehlen party, “Group 6,” was checking out its very

comfortable accommodations at Fort Hunt at the very

moment at which Donovan, writing from a borrowed

Washington office, fired back a memo to Smith

defending the OSS and its right to live:

Among these assets [of the OSS] was establishment for

the first time in our nation’s history of a foreign

secret intelligence service which reported information

as seen through American eyes. As an integral and

inseparable part of this service, there is a group of specialists to analyze and evaluate the material for presentation to those who determine national policy.”50

Much more significant than the question of the

adequacy of U.S. intelligence on the Soviet Union,

however, was the question of civilian versus military

control of the intelligence mission. Germany and

England had fought this battle in the 19th century,

the military capturing the intelligence role in

Germany and the civilians maintaining a position in

England. Throughout the summer and fall of 1945, this

same battle raged in the U.S. government.51 The battle

for intelligence control was indeed the background for

the arrival of Gehlen and his six aides at Fort Hunt,

where Gehlen’s party was housed and Gehlen himself

provided with an NCO butler and several white-jacket

order lies.52

 

A momentous relationship was established at Fort Hunt,

one that had the profoundest effects on the subsequent evolution of United States foreign policy during an exceptionally difficult passage of world history. The period of the Cold War as a whole, and more especially its early, formative years – from Gehlen’s coming aboard the American intelligence service until he rejoined the West German republic in 1955 — was laden with the peril of nuclear war. On at least one occasion, in 1948,53 Gehlen almost convinced the United States that the Soviet Union was about to launch a war against the West and that it would be in the U.S. interest to preempt it.

Clearly it is important to know who made and

authorized the decisions that led to our national

dependency on a network of underground Nazis, yet

because the relevant documents are still classified

this central part of the Gehlen story still cannot be reconstructed.

From the handful of published books about the Gehlen

affair (none of which cite their sources on this

point) we can list only seven Americans who were said

to be involved with Gehlen at Fort Hunt:

Admiral William D. Leahy, chief of staff end Truman’s

national security advisor.

Allen Dulles, OSS station chief in Bern during the

war.

Sherman Kent, head of OSS Research and Analysis Branch

and a Yale historian. General George V. Strong, head of Army G-2. Major General Alex H. Bolling of G-2.

Brigadier General John T. Magruder, first head of the

Army’s Strategic Services Unit, a vulture of OSS.

Loftus E. Becker, a lawyer assc. with G-2 and the

Nuremberg war-crimes operation; the CIA’s first deputy director.

We do not know if these people were involved as a

committee, if they talked with Gehlen and his six

aides a lot or a little, separately or all at once, or

if they sent their own aides to work out the details.

We do not know how a POW-interrogation was transformed

into a bargaining process. Above all, we do not know

what kind of communication the U.S. participants in

the Fort Hunt-Gehlen talks had with the political

authorities to whom they were responsible. Leahy is

the only one who had obvious contact with President

Truman. But there is nothing in the revealed record to

indicate that he ever discussed Gehlen or the Fort

Hunt deal with Truman, or took the least trouble to

explain to Truman the implications of hiring a Nazi

spy network. We have no idea, for that matter, how

Leahy himself saw it.

 

What we do know is the outlines of the Gehlen deal

itself, however it was hammered out and however it was

or was not ratified by legal, political authority.

That is because Gehlen himself laid out its terms in

his autobiography, The Service. Gehlen says in this

work (which has been attacked for its inaccuracies)

that the discussion ended with “a gentleman’s

agreement,” that the terms of his relationship with

the United States were “for a variety of reasons never

set down in black and white.” He continues, “Such was

the element of trust that had been built up between

the two sides during this year of intensive personal

contact that neither had the slightest hesitation in

founding the entire operation on a verbal agreement

and a handshake.”54

 

According Gehlen, this agreement consisted of the

following six basic points. His language is worth

savoring. “I remember the terms of the agreement

well,” he wrote:

“1. A clandestine German intelligence organization was

to be set up. using the existing potential to continue information gathering in the East just as we had been doing before. The basis for this was our common interest in a defense against communism.”

“2. This German organization was to work not ‘for’ or

‘under’ the Americans, but ‘jointly with the

Americans.”

“3. The organization would operate exclusively under

German leadership, which would receive its directives

and assignments from the Americans until a new

government was established in Germany.”

“4. The organization was to be financed by the

Americans with funds which were not to be part of the occupation costs, and in return the organization would supply all its intelligence reports to the Americans.” (The Gehlen Organization’s first annual budget is said have been $3.4 million.55)”

“5. As soon as a sovereign German government was

established, that government should decide whether the organization should continue to function or not. but that until such time the care and control (later referred to as ‘the trusteeship’) of the organization would remain in American hands.”

“6. Should the organization at any time find itself in

a position where the American and German interests

diverged, it was accepted that the organization would

consider the interests of Germany first.”56

Gehlen acknowledges that the last point especially

might “raise some eyebrows” and make some think that

the U.S. side “had one overboard in making concessions

to us.” He assures his readers that actually “this

point demonstrates better than any other Sibert’s

great vision: he recognized that for many years to

come the interests of the United States and West

Germany must run parallel.”57

Gehlen and his staff left Fort Hunt for Germany on

July 1, 1946, having been in the United States for

almost a year. They were temporarily based at

Oberursel then settled into a permanent base in a

walled-in, self-contained village at Pullach near

Munich. Gehlen set up his headquarters in an estate

originally built by Martin Bormann.58 There a start-up

group of 50 began to turn the “gentlemen’s agreement”

of Fort Hunt into reality. The first order of business

being staff, Gehlen’s recruiters were soon circulating

among the “unemployed mass” of “former” Nazi SS men,

the Odessa constituency, to find more evaluators,

couriers and informers.59 Gehlen had “solemnly

promised in Washington not to employ SS and Gestapo

men,”60 although it will be noted that Gehlen includes

no such provision in his list of terms. There is not

the least question that he did recruit such men,

supplying them with new names when necessary.

Two of the worst of them were Franz Six and Emil

Augsburg. Six was a key Nazi intellectual, and both

Six and Augsburg were associated with the Wannsee

Institute, the Nazi think-tank in Berlin where SS

leader Reinhard Heydrich, in January 1942, announced

“the Final Solution to the Jewish Question.” Both of

them had commanded extermination squads roving in East

Europe in pursuit of Jews and communists. and both had

gone underground with the Odessa when the Third Reich

crumbled. Augsburg hid in Italy, then returned in

disguise when Gehlen called. Six was actually captured

by Allied intelligence, tried at Nuremberg and

imprisoned, only to be sprung to work with Augsburg

running Gehlen’s networks of East European Nazis.61

From the edge of total defeat Gehlen now moved into

his vintage years, more powerful, influential and

independent than he had been even in the heyday of the

Third Reich. Minimally supervised first by the War

Department’s Strategic Services Unit under Fort Hunt

figure Major General John Magruder, and then by the

SSU’s follow-on organization, the Central Intelligence

Group under Rear Admiral Sidney Souers,62 the Org grew

to dominate the entire West German intelligence

service. Through his close ties to Chancellor Konrad

Adenauer’s chief minister, Hans Globke, Gehlen was

able to place his men in positions of control in West

Germany’s military intelligence and the internal counterintelligence arm. When NATO was established he came to dominate it too. By one estimate “some 70 percent” of the total intelligence take flowing into NATO’S military committee and Allied headquarters (SHAPE) on the Soviet Union, the countries of East Europe, the rest of Europe, and indeed the rest of the world was generated at Pullach.63

READ  1969: NWO Insider Reveals Entire NWO Plan - VIDEO 4:13:14

Not even the establishment of the CIA in 1947 and the

official transfer of the Pullach operation into the

West German government in 1955 (when it was retitled

the Federal Intelligence Service, BND) lessened the

reliance of American intelligence on Gehlen’s

product.64 From the beginning days of the Cold War

through the 1970s and beyond, the United State’s, West Germany’s, and NATO’s most positive beliefs about the nature and intentions of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and world communism would be supplied by an international network of utterly unreconstructed SS Nazis whose primary purposes were to cover the escape of the Odessa and make the world safe for Naziism.

 

The Cost of the Fort Hunt Treaty

Gehlen’s story has may branchings beyond this point. These include several spy scandals that exposed his operation as dangerously vulnerable to Soviet penetration. They include the pitiful spectacle of U.S. CIC agents pursuing Nazi fugitives on war-crimes charges only to see them summarily pardoned and hired by Gehlen. They include the dark saga of Klaus Barbie, the SS “Butcher of Lyon” who worked with the Gehlen Organization and boasted of being a member of the Odessa. They include assets of Operation Paperclip, in which right-wing forces in the U.S. military once again savaged the concept of de-Nazification in order to smuggle scores of SS rocket scientists into the United States. They include continuation of the civilian-vs.-military conflict over the institution of secret intelligence and the question of politically motivated covert action within the domestic interior. They include above all the story of the enormous victory of the Odessa in planting powerful Nazi colonies around the world — in such countries as South Africa where the enactment of apartheid laws followed; or several countries in Latin America that then became breeding grounds for the Death Squads of the current day; and indeed even in the United States where it now appears that thousands of wanted Nazis were able to escape justice and grow old in peace.

 

In making the Gehlen deal, the United States did not

acquire for itself an intelligence service. That is

not what the Gehlen group was or was trying to be. The

military intelligence historian Colonel William Corson

put it most succinctly, “Gehlen’s organization was

designed to protect the Odessa Nazis. It amounts to an exceptionally well-orchestrated diversion.”65 The only intelligence provided by the Gehlen net to the United States was intelligence selected specifically to worsen East-West tensions and increase the possibility of military conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. It was exactly as the right-wing pairs had warned in 1945 when they were aroused by Donovan’s proposal for a permanent intelligence corps, warning their readers that a “super spy unit” could “determine American foreign policy by weeding out, withholding or coloring information gathered at his direction.”66 It was exactly as Truman had warned when he demobilized the OSS with the observation that the U.S. had no interest in “Gestapolike measures.” The fact that this lively concern for a police-state apparatus should have been focused on the relatively innocuous OSS while at the same time the red carpet was being rolled out for Gehlen’s gang of SS men must surely count as one of the supreme wrenching ironies of the modern period.

 

Another dimension of the cost the Gehlen deal is the

stress it induced within American institutions,

weakening them incalculably. The Gehlen Organization

was the antithesis of the Allied cause, its sinister

emergence on the scene of post-war Europe the very

opposite of what the western democracies thought they

had been fighting for.

 

Perhaps at least we can say that, despite Gehlen and

despite the military, the United States did after all

finally wind up with a civilian intelligence service.

The National Security Act of 1947 did embody Donovan’s

central point in creating a CIA outside the military.

But in fact the Gehlen Org substantially pre-empted

the CIA’s civilian character before it was ever born.

The CIA was born to be rocked in Gehlen’s cradle. It

remained dependent on the Org even when the Org turned

into the BND. Thus, whatever the CIA was from the

standpoint of the law, it remained from the standpoint

of practical intelligence collection a front for a

house of Nazi spies.

The Org was not merely military, which is bad, not

merely foreign, which is much worse, and not merely

Nazi, which is intolerable; it was not even

professionally committed to the security of the U.S.

and Western Europe. It was committed exclusively to

the security of the Odessa. All the Gehlen Org ever

wanted the U.S. to be was anti-communist, the more

militantly so the better. It never cared in the least

for the security of the United States, its

Constitution or its democratic tradition.

 

It is not the point of this essay that there would

have been no Cold War if the Odessa had not wanted it

and had not been able, through the naive collaboration

of the American military Right to place Gehlen and his

network in a position that ought to have been occupied

by a descendant of the OSS. But it was precisely

because the world was so volatile and confusing as of

the transition from World War II to peacetime that the

U.S. needed to see it, as Donovan put it in his

plaintive appeal to Truman in the summer of 1945,

“through American eyes.” No Nazi eyes, however bright,

could see it for us without deceiving us and leading

us to the betrayal of our own national character.

Second, there was no way to avoid the Cold War once we

had taken the desperate step of opening our doors to

Gehlen. From that moment on, from the summer of 1945

when the Army brought him into the United States and

made a secret deal with him, the Cold War was locked

in. A number of Cold War historians on the left (for

example D.F. Fleming and Gabriel Kolko) have made

cogent arguments that from the Soviet point of view

the Cold War was thrust upon us by an irrational and belligerent Stalin. The story of the secret treaty of Fort Hunt exposes this “history” as a self-serving political illusion. On the contrary, the war in the Pacific was still raging and the United States was still trying to get the Soviet Union into the war against Japan when General Sibert was already deep into his relation ship with Gehlen.

The key point that comes crashing through the

practical and moral confusion about this matter, once

one sees that Gehlen’s Organization was an arm of the

Odessa, is that, whether it was ethical or not, the

U.S. did not pick up a Gift Horse in Gehlen at all; it

picked up a Trojan Horse.

 

The unconditional surrender the Germans made to the

Allied command at the little red schoolhouse in Reims

was the surrender only of the German armed services.

It was not the surrender of the hard SS core of the

Nazi Party. The SS did not surrender, unconditionally

or otherwise, and thus Nazism itself did not

surrender. The SS chose rather, to seek other means of continuing the war while the right wing of the United States military establishment, through fears and secret passions and a naivete of its own, chose to facilitate that choice. The history that we have lived through since then stands witness to the consequences.

References

Carl Oglesby is the author of several books,

notably The Yankee and Cowboy War. He has published a

variety of articles on political themes. In 1965 he

was the President of Students for a Democratic

Society. He is the director of The Institute for

Continuing de-Nazification. For information on the

Institute write to: 294 Harvard Street, #3, Cambridge.

MA 02139.

 

William Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich

(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960), p. 1140.

Ibid., p. 1033 fn. Enunciation of this policy

surprised and upset some U.S. military leaders who

feared it would prolong the war. See, for example,

William R. Corson (USMC ret.), The Armies of

Ignorance: The Rite of the American Intelligence

Empire (New York: Dial Press, 1977), pp. 8-10.

William Stevenson, The Bormann Brotherhood: A New

Investigation of the Escape and Survival of Nazi War

Criminals (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973).

Op. cit. n. 1, p. 1072.

Ibid., pp. 1091-92

This discussion of Bormann’s strategy is based mainly

on Glenn B. Infield, Skorzeny: Hitler’s Commando (New

York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981); and op. cit., n. 3.

My summary of the Nazi survival plan is based on op.

cit., n. 3; Infield, op. cit., n. 6; Ladislas Farago,

Aftermath: Martin Bormann and the Fourth Reich (New

York: Simon & Schuster, 1974); Charles Higham,

American Swastika (New York: Doubleday, 1985); Brian

Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich (New

York: Penguin, 1964); and Simon Wiesenthal, The

Murderers Among Us (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967). On

“neo-Nazi” colonies in the Near and Middle East and

South America, see Wiesenthal, pp. 78-95.

Infield, op. cit., n. 6. p. 192.

Ibid., p. 179; and Wiesenthal, op. cit., n. 7. pp.

87-88.

Wiesenthal, op. cit., n. 7, p. 88. Also quoted in

Infield, op. cit., n. 6, p. 183.

Infield, op. cit., n. 6, p. 183.

Schacht, who had lost favor with Hitler in 1938, was

acquitted of war-crimes charges by the Nuremberg

Tribunal. He was later convicted of being a “chief

Nazi offender” by the German de-Nazification court at Baden-Wurttemberg, but his conviction was overturned and his eight-year sentence lifted on September 2, 1948. Infield, op cit., n. 6.

Infield, op cit., n. 6, p. 16.

Heinz Hohne and Hermann Zolling, The General Was A Spy

(New York: Richard Barry, Coward McCann & Geoghegan,

1973), p. 54; and E.H. Cookridge, Gehlen, Spy of the

Century (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 120.

Christopher Simpson, Blowback (New York: Weidenfeld

and Nicolson, 1988), p. 160 ff. Simpson’s is the best

book on the Gehlen matter so far published.

Ibid., pp. 254-55.

Ibid., pp. 180, 193.

Ibid., pp. 10, 207-08.

Ibid., pp. 18-22. Also see Hohne and Zolling, op.

cit., n. 14, pp. 35-37; Cookridge, op. cit., n. 14,

pp. 56-58.

Cookridge op. cit., n. 14, p. 79.

Reinhard Gehlen, The Service (New York: World, 1972),

p. 99.

Ibid., p. 107.

Cookridge, op. cit., n. 14, pp. 103, 106.

I do not know of an estimate of the size of the

Foreign Armies East (FHO) as of the end of the war.

Cookridge, op. cit., n. 14, p. 161, says that by 1948,

when the Gehlen Organization was probably back up to

war-time speed, its key agents “exceeded four

thousand.” Each agent typically ran a net of about six informants, Cookridge, op. cit., n. 14, p. 167. Thus, the total Gehlen net might have numbered in the range of 20,000 individuals

Op. cit., n. 21, p. 115.

Corson, op. cit., n. 2, pp. 6, 20; Anthony Cave Brown,

The Last Hero, Wild Bill Donovan (N.Y.: Vintage Books,

1982), p. 625; U.S. Senate, “Final Report of the

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with

Respect to Intelligence Activities,” Book IV,

Supplementary Staff Reports on Foreign and Military Intelligence (known as, The Church Report), p. 5.

Cookridge, op. cit., n. 14, p.130.

Brown, op. cit., n. 26, p. 626.

Cookridge, op. cit., n. 14, p. 131.

William M. Leary, ed., The Central Intelligence

Agency: History and Documents (Atlanta: University of

Atlanta Press, 1984), pp. 123-25; Corson, op cit., n.

2, pp. 214-17; Brown, op. cit., n. 26, p. 625.

Brown, op. cit., n. 26, p. 627.

Ibid., p. 170.

Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard

Helms and the CIA (New York: Pocket Books, 1981), p.

31.

Ibid.

Brown, op. cit., n. 26, p. 744.

This account of Gehlen’s surrender is based on Hohne

and Zolling, op. cit., n. 14, pp. 52-56; Cookridge, op

cit., n. 14, pp. 118-21; op. cit., 3, pp. 89-90; op

cit., n. 15, pp. 41-43; and the BBC documentary,

Superspy: The Story of Reinhard Gehlen, 1974. There

are many trivial discrepancies in these four accounts

but they are in perfect agreement as to the main

thrust.

Cookridge, op. cit., n. 14, p. 120.

Hohne and Zolling, op. cit., n. 14, p. 58.

As to breaking orders, Gehlen is effusive in his

praise of “Sibert’s great vision…. I stand in

admiration of Sibert as a general who this this bold

step — in a situation fraught with political pitfalls

— of taking over the intelligence experts of a former

enemy for his own country…. The political risk to

which Sibert was exposed was very great. Anti-German

feeling was running high, and he had created our

organizations without any authority from Washington

and without the knowledge of the War Department.” Op.

cit., n. 21, p. 123.

Hohne and Zolling, op. cit., n. 14, p. 58.

Ibid., pp. 58-59.

Op. cit., n. 21, p. 120.

Hohne and Zolling, op. cit., n. 14, p. 58.

Undated CIA fragment with head, “Recent Books,”

apparently published circa 1972, partly declassified

and released in 1986 in response to a Freedom of

Information (FOIA) suit.

Hohne and Zolling, op. cit., n. 14, pp. 56, 58-59.

U.S. Army document SHAEF D-95096, September 15, 1946, declassified FOIA release. The routing of this cable through SHAEF HQ raises a question as to whether Eisenhower was really kept in the dark about Gehlen.

As Gehlen was about to leave for the United States, he

left a message for Baun with another of his top aides,

Gerhard Wessel: “I am to tell you from Gehlen that he

has discussed with [Hitler’s successor Admiral Karl]

Doenitz and [Gehlen’s superior and chief of staff

General Franz] Halder the question of continuing his

work with the Americans. Both were in agreement.”

Hohne and Zolling, op. cit., n. 14, p. 61.

There is variance in the literature concerning how

many assistants Gehlen took with him toWashington.

John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the

CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 92;

Cookridge, op. cit., n. 14, p. 125; and op. cit., n.

15, p. 42, say it was three while Hohne and Zolling,

op. cit., n. 14, p. 61, say four. A U.S. Army note of

August 28, 1945 (a 1986 FOIA release) refers to “the 7

shipped by air last week” and that no doubt is the

correct number. Another FOIA release, an unnumbered

Military Intelligence Division document dated

September 30, 1945, originated at Fort Hunt, labels

the Gehlen party as “Group 6” and names seven

members: Gehlen, Major Alberg Schoeller, Major Horst

Hiemenz, Colonel Heinz Herre, Colonel Konrad

Stephanus, and two others whose rank is not given,

Franz Hinrichs and Herbert Feukner. The number is

important for what it says about the nature of

Gehlen’s trip, Three might be thought of as

co-defendants but six constitute a staff. Cookridge,

op. cit., n. 14, p. 125, says Gehlen made the trip

disguised in the uniform of a one-star American

general, his aides disguised as U.S. captains. Hohne

and Zolling, op. cit., n. 14, pp. 60-61, inflate the

rank to two stars but then call the story spurious.

Gehlen’s memoir says nothing about it.

Corson, op. cit., n. 2, p. 239.

Ibid., p. 240.

Ranelagh, op. cit., n. 48, p. 102ff.

BBC documentary, Superspy, op. cit., n. 36. Corson, in

an interview with the author, said the butler and the

orderlies must have been CIC agents. Still, the detail

rankles.

Cookridge, op. cit., n. 14, 203; op. cit., n. 15. p.

136.

Op. cit., n. 21, p. 121. Hohne and Zolling, op. cit.,

n. 14. p. 64, say that the details of this

“gentlemen’s agreement” were put into writing by the

CIA in 1949.

Hohne and Zolling, op. cit., n. 14, p. 65.

Op. cit., n. 21, p. 122.

Ibid., pp. 122-23.

Hohne and Zolling, op. cit., n. 14, p. 119; Cookridge,

op. cit., n. 14, p. 155, BBC documentary, Superspy,

op. cit., n. 36.

Hohne and Zolling, op. cit., n. 14, p. 67.

Cookridge, op. cit., n. 14, p. 144.

Op. cit., n. 15, pp. 17, 46-47, 166, 225; Cookridge,

op. cit., n. 14, pp. 242-43.

Hohne and Zolling, op. cit., n. 14, p. 133.

Cookridge, op. cit., n. 14, p. 218.

Ibid., p. 128.

Author’s interview with Corson, May, 1986.

Cookridge, op. cit., n. 14, p. 131.

(This article was originally from CovertAction

Information Bulletin, Fall, 1990)

NOTE: PREVAILING WINDS RESEARCH fully endorses the

work of CovertAction Information Bulletin and we urge

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